Here I share a few notes I used in various course lectures, talks, etc. Some may be just calculations that in the textbooks are more complicated, scattered, or less specific; others may be simple observations I found useful or curious.
Nemirovski Estimate of Common Mean of Arbitrary Distributions with Bounded Variance
The popular Chernoff bounds 1 assume severe restrictions on distribution: it must be cutoff, or vanish exponentially, etc. In [Nemirovsky Yudin] 2 an equally simple bound uses no conditions at all beyond independence and known bound on variance. It is not widely used because it is not explained anywhere with an explicit tight computation. I offer this version:
Assume independent variables X i (ω) with the same unknown mean m and known lower bounds B 2 i on inverses 1/v i of their variance. We estimate m as M (ω) with probability P (±(M−m) ≥ ε) def = p ± < 2 −k for k close to (B i ε) 2 /12. First, we normalize X i to set ε = 1, spread them into n groups, and take in each group j its B [1,n] has s +t elements. As s ∈ L t do not include each other, L t ≤ n n/2 < 2 n 2/(πn), by Sperner's theorem, and since n! = (n/e) n √ 2πn + θ n , π/3 < θ n ≤ e 2 −2π.
Our M is the (log b j )-weighted median of x j . Let S ± (ω) def = {j : ±(x j −m) < 1}. Then ±(M (ω)−m) ≥ 1 means S ± (ω) ∈ L. By Chebyshev's inequality, p ± j def = P (j ∈ S ± ) ≤ 1/(b 2 j +1). We assume p ± j = 1/(b 2 j +1): the general case follows by so modifying the distribution without changing m, b j , or decreasing p + (respectively p − ). If s ∈ L t , S ± (ω) = s has probability
Leftover Hash Lemma
The following Lemma is often useful to convert a stream of symbols with absolutely unknown (except for a lower bound on its entropy) distribution into a source of perfectly uniform random bits b ∈ Z 2 = {0, 1}. The version I give is close to that in [HILL] 4 , though some aspects are closer to that from [GL] 5 . Unlike [GL], I do not restrict hash functions to be linear and do not guarantee polynomial reductions, i.e. I forfeit the case when the unpredictability of the source has computational, rather than truly random, nature. However, like [GL] , I restrict hash functions only in probability of collisions, not requiring pairwise uniform distribution.
Let G be a probability distribution on Z n 2 with Renyi entropy
2 be a hash function family in the sense that for each x, y = x the fraction of h with
h (a)) generated by identity and
Lemma 1 (Leftover Hash Lemma)
Note that h must be uniformly distributed but can be reused for many different x. These x need to be independent only of h, not of each other as long as they have ≥ m entropy in the distribution conditional on all their predecessors.
Proof.
Disputed Ballots and Poll Instabilities
Here is another curious example of advantages of quadratic norms. The ever-vigilant struggle of major parties for the heart of the median voter makes many elections quite tight. Add the Electoral College system of the US Presidential elections and the history may hang on a small number of ballots in one state. The problem is not in the randomness of the outcome. In fact, chance brings a sort of fair power sharing unplagued with indecision: either party wins sometimes, but the country always has only one leader. If a close race must be settled by dice, so be it. But the dice must be trusty and immune to manipulation! Alas, this is not what our systems assure. Of course, old democratic traditions help avoiding outrages endangering younger democracies, such as Ukraine. Yet, we do not want parties to compete on tricks that may decide the elections: appointing partisan election officials or judges, easing voter access in sympathetic districts, etc. Better to make the randomness of the outcome explicit, giving each candidate a chance depending on his/her share of the vote. It is easy to implement the lottery in an infallible way, the issue is how its chance should depend on the share of votes.
In contrast to the present one, the system should avoid any big jump from a small change in the number of votes. Yet, chance should not be proportional to the share of votes. Otherwise each voter may vote for himself, rendering election of a random person. The present system encourages voters to consolidate around candidates acceptable to many others. The 'jumpless' system should preserve this feature. This can be done by using a non-linear function: say the chance in the post-poll lottery be proportional to the squared number of votes. In other words, a voter has one vote per each person he agrees with.
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Consider for instance an 8-way race where the percents of votes are 60, 25, 10, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1. The leader's chance will be 5/6, his main rival's 1/7, the third party candidate's 1/43 and the combined chance of the five 'protest' runners 1/866. This system would force major parties to determine the most popular candidate via some sort of primaries, and will almost exclude marginal runners. However it would have no discontinuity rendering any small change in the vote distribution irrelevant. The system would preserve an element of chance, but would be resistant to manipulation. 6 The dependence of lottery odds on the share of votes may be sharper. Yet, it must be smooth to minimize the effects of manipulation. Even (trusty) noise alone, e.g., discarding a randomly chosen half of the votes, can "smooth" the system a little.
Proofs in Three Envelopes
Below is a slightly simplified account of Zero-knowledge proofs that were developed in [Goldwasser Micali Rackoff, 7 Goldreich Micali Wigderson, 8 Shamir 9 ]. I wrote this account under the influence of Manuel Blum's constructions 10 during several conversations with him when I visited him in 1986.
Consider an undirected graph:
Its coloring is a mapping C : v → {1, 2, 3}, s.t. each edge (a, b) ∈ g has distinct colors: C(a) = C(b). Since 3-colorability is NP-complete, any mathematical statement can be reduced in polynomial time to a statement of graph colorability, so that any proof of either statement can be transformed in polynomial time into the proof of the other. We consider only graphs composed of 3 isomorphic connected components. Any coloring of such graph can be made balanced, i.e. such that the nodes of each degree are equally spread between the 3 colors. We consider only such balanced colorings.
The Prover (P) uses a random string ω to generate random enumerations p : v → v of nodes and q : g → g of edges. Then P makes three envelopes: E 1 (g, ω), E 2 (g, ω), E 3 (g, ω, C). E 1 contains p and the mapping of reciprocal edges: q(a, b) → q(b, a). E 2 contains the mapping of edges to their source nodes: q(a, b) → p(a) and E 3 contains their coloring q(a, b) → C(a)). The verifier (V) then chooses any two of the envelopes and checks their consistency.
If the envelopes do not represent a correct coloring then some two of them are obviously inconsistent with the graph or with each other. It is also easy to see that the joint probability distribution of any two envelopes does not depend on (balanced) coloring and can be trivially generated from the graph alone. E 1 , E 2 do not mention C at all. E 1 , E 3 contain just p and an unrelated to it balanced mapping of permuted edges to their colors. E 2 , E 3 contain the permutation and colors of nodes and also maps to them their permuted outgoing edges with unspecified destination.
So the Prover gives away no information besides the validity of his proof, while the verifier has a 1/3 chance to catch him if the proof is incorrect. Repeating the game k times with independent ω decreases the chance of fake proofs to remain un-exposed to (2/3) k . Of course, for implementing such game one needs something like cryptography to commit the Prover to the content of the envelopes, without revealing it before he learns the verifier's choice.
Graph non-isomorphism
A simple protocol of [Goldreich Micali Wigderson] shows in zero knowledge that an isomorphism of two graphs g 1 , g 2 is known. P first sends V a random permutation h of g 1 . Then V chooses at random i ∈ {1, 2} and P sends V the isomorphism of h to g i . Non-isomorphism [Goldreich Micali Wigderson] has almost as simple protocol. Let g be the graph whose connected components are g 1 and g 2 . V sends P a random permutation h of g and proves in zero-knowledge that (s)he knows an isomorphism of h to g. Then P tells V if the permutation maps the two components of g onto themselves or onto each other.
Assumptions of Randomness in Cosmology Models
Non-compact symmetries cannot be fully broken by randomness since non-compact Lie groups have no invariant probability distributions. In particular, this makes trickier the "Copernican" random choice of the place of the observer in infinite cosmology models.
Physics laws allow all sorts of events and histories. In infinite cosmology models each one of them rolls out infinitely often: weirdest miracles are daily routine in some places. To understand our boring world one must assume our place is rather generic. So, theories assume some events happen at random, others are derived from them by physical equations or other algorithms. In fact, Kučera [Lect.Notes in Math, 1141] and Gács [Inf.Control 70/2,3] prove that any sequence is computable from an algorithmically random one.
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However, the theories of this type can only be complete if they specify which exactly are the random events and what is their probability distribution. These events need not be directly observable, rather just be a part of the model from which the observations are derived. But the specification of this set of "external" events (not meant to be derived in the model, but rather assumed random) is often glossed over. Someone like Laplace, or another classical deist, might assume this to be the set of positions and speeds of all particles at the initial state of the Universe. The Creator would set them up, then retire, leaving the rest to the equations of physics. But this choice is quite arbitrary. The Creator could as easily set up the final state of the Universe at random. (As all equations known to Laplace were time-reversible.) Then the initial state would be very non-random! Even more elegant would be to set externally both initial and final positions of particles (and those on borders, if any), but no speeds. After all, the positions of a thrown stone at two moments of time, determine its trajectory in-between. Different choices of events designated as external, and assumed random, lead to quite different predictions.
The model also needs to describe what is a legitimate set of observations, which includes specifying the observer (say, the humanity with its followers). Some models have the Universe as a whole in a pure state, any perceived entropy due to the whole being unobservable: any specific observer can see only a part, which is in a mixed state. Then the choice of the observer is actually the source of the randomness. While the theory may be largely indifferent to the choice of a specific observer, it may be impossible to formulate without such a choice: remote observers cannot communicate and combine their experiences. The choice of the observer is as much a part of a complete model, as is the choice of state of the rest of the universe.
A technical difficulty comes up here. While, the observable part of the world is finite, many models include it in a greater infinite realm, beyond our reach. How to choose our (observer's) place in this realm at random is puzzling. Say, in a most primitive setting, how to choose a random point in a pattern on an infinite Euclidean space? There is no uniform probability distribution there. (In other models, where ours is one of the infinitely many "bubbles," it may be even trickier.) A way around this technicality can lie in the reverse order of choices. Instead of first building an infinite universe and then choosing the place of the observer there, we can first designate the observer, then build an infinite universe around her. This circumvents the lack of uniform distributions in infinite domains (and tickles our ego, besides :-).
This brings up a question, what is an observer? Its many meanings depend on what symmetries are being given up. In quantum physics observer can mean a macroscopic system brought into an entanglement with the observed microscopic variables. "Macroscopic" is a vague term with unclear relevance. Sometimes it is put in relation with the Plank mass (e.g., by R.Penrose). But it is unclear why a microscopic bacteria, much lighter than Plank mass, cannot perfectly serve as an observer. (It could transmit its observed data to its descendants, which may include members of Royal Society. :-)
What seems relevant here, is that the observed data, unlike generic quantum states, can be reliably copied, preserved, transmitted, etc. For this an observer needs some sophistication, access to mechanisms for error-correction, self-preservation, etc.
12 Such features are readily present in life. Our world is in a state that harbors life, however mysterious is life's origin. The present living creatures developed by evolution. But for evolution even to start, it needs systems fully capable of copying themselves, along with accumulated random mutations. The first such systems could not be produced by evolution, so must appear spontaneously. The minimal complexity of such systems might be quite high, and the chance of spontaneous generation be exponentially small in this complexity -too tiny even for cosmological scales.
If so, how to deal with these tiny probabilities? It may be that the laws of physics are fine-tuned to boost these probabilities.
13 But it may be that this fine-tuning requires high complexity of such fine-tuned laws, which just transfers the tiny probability issue from live systems to laws of physics. However, the mystery seems to soften with the abovementioned priority of choosing the observer. If our models start with choosing an observer (and then building a universe around it) then the worlds with no observers are excluded before computing the probabilities.
Such settings may also help with another issue. Some fundamental laws of physics seem to yield paradoxes or even conflict with each other. But it may suffice for our needs if the laws are only approximately sound. For instance, the observer cannot be absolutely reliable. It may spontaneously tunnel into something entirely different, albeit with an exponentially small probability. A theory may be clear if such effects are ignored, assuming the observer behaves "as advertised". And it may be O.K. for the theory to become incomprehensible if such negligible likelihoods, like observer's drastic tunneling, must be accounted for.
12 requiring free energy flow: thus gravity, as its ultimate source, may play a role for observers, even if not via Plank mass. 13 I avoid the popular but unclear term "Anthropic principle." (As was said "To discover a land means to look upon it with the eyes of a European, preferably British." Is fluent English required for being fully Anthropic? :-) I assume for observers only the seemingly relevant abovementioned "copyright" for observed data. I even ignore another aspect, often assumed relevant, -the free will. Stretching the relevance, let me at least explain how I understand the free will.
We model some systems describing their behavior or a probability distribution under which that behavior is random. (The model needs to be somehow operational. E.g., serious brain illnesses often remain unknown until too advanced to cure, even though that information is present somewhere in the brain.) Physics equations generate the world from some random variables. Observations change their original probability distribution, conditioning it on the observed knowledge. Observations reveal only some complicated derivative restrictions on the original, not directly observed, random variables. This makes modeling tricky: we guess our environment via "Occam Razor" instead of computing probabilities directly; analogies play an important role. But an impossibility of having an adequate model of a system is expressed as its free will. A modeling entity needs to exceed the modeled one in complexity. So one cannot model himself and must accept his own free will. And free will is "contagious": extends to anything interacting with a free-willed entity.
As an example of free will subtlety let me bring Hillel's Golden Rule (expect yourself to be treated the way you treat others). It can be promoted by effective systems of justice (expensive and tricky to design) that reveal, judge, and reciprocate what we do to each other. It can also be promoted by a PR-induced faith that such a system exists, working in some mysterious way. But PR and mysteries, overused for corrupt purposes, meet widespread skepticism nowadays which impairs that approach. The meaning of free will clarifies another approach. Observing my own unpredictable actions, I learn more about myself. I interact with fellow humans who share with me origins, environment, and many qualities. Thus learning about myself, I indirectly learn about them, too. This knowledge changes the probability distribution on my environment. For instance, my kind or wicked acts, besides their immediate effects, reveal to me more aspects of human nature, of which mine is the most intimately visible example. This subtle "two-way street" effect of our free will (on human nature we get to expect) sheds some light on the faith in the Golden Rule.
Universal Heuristics:
How do humans solve "unsolvable" problems?
Lots of crucial problems defeat current computer arts but yield to our brains. Great many of them can be stated in the form of inverting easily computable functions. Still other problems, such as extrapolation, are related to this form. We have no idea which difficulties are intrinsic to these problems and which just reflect our ignorance. We will remain puzzled pending major foundational advances such as, e.g., on P=?NP. And yet, traveling salesmen do get to their destinations, mathematicians do find proofs of their theorems, and physicists do find patterns in transformations of their elementary particles! How is this done, and how could computers emulate their success?
Brains of insects solve problems of such complexity and with such efficiency, as we cannot dream of. Yet, few of us would be flattered with a comparison to the brain of an insect :-). What advantage do we, humans, have? One is the ability to solve new problems, those on which evolution did not train generations of our ancestors. We must have some pretty universal methods, not restricted to the specifics of focused problems. Of course, it is hard to tell how, say, the mathematicians search for their proofs. Yet, the diversity and dynamism of math achievements suggest that some pretty universal methods must be at work.
In fact, whatever the difficulty of inverting functions x=f (y) is, we know a "theoretically" optimal algorithm for all such problems, one that cannot be sped-up 14 by more than a constant factor, even on a subset of instances x. It searches for solutions y, but in order of increasing complexity Kt, not increasing length: short solutions may be much harder to find than long ones. Kt(y|x) can be defined as the minimal sum of (1) the bit-length of a prefixless program p transforming x into y and (2) the log of the running time of p.
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Extrapolations could be done by double-use of this concept. The likelihood of a given extrapolation consistent with known data decreases exponentially with the length of its shortest description. This principle, Occam Razor, was clarified in papers by Ray Solomonoff and his followers (see also http://http://arxiv.org/abs/1403.4539 and its references).
Decoding short descriptions should not take more time than the complexity of the process that generated the data. The major hurdle in implementing Occam Razor is finding short descriptions: it may be exponentially hard. Yet, this is an inversion problem, and the above optimal search applies. Such approaches contrast with the methods employed currently by CS -universal algorithms are used heavily, but mostly for negative results.
The point of this note is to emphasize the following problem: The above methods are optimal only up to constant factors. Nothing is known about these factors, and simplistic attempts make them completely unreasonable. Current theory cannot even answer straight questions, such as, e.g., is it true that some such optimal algorithm cannot be sped-up 10-fold on infinitely many instances? Yet humans do seem to use such generic methods successfully, raising hopes for a reasonable approach to these factors.
